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Abstract: We analyse the Polish wage and unemployment structure between 1992
and 1995 on the basis of the Polish Labour Force Survey. It is shown that within this
period wage inequality has stabilised. Surprisingly, wage inequality is lower in the
private than in the public sector. Our test results show that, contrary to the public
sector, there are no gender differences in the valuation of human capital in the private
sector. This supports the hypothesis that the transition towards a market economy
promotes the equality of the sexes. Although the higher–education wage premium has
risen significantly over the observation period, the ceteris paribus wage differential
between white–collar and blue–collar workers is about zero. Indeed, we find that
blue–collar workers as well as workers in the mining, manufacturing, and
construction industries have kept or improved their relative wage position despite an
increase in unemployment for these groups. There is therefore significant evidence for
rigidities in the Polish labour market.
11 Introduction
According to widely held opinion, wage inequality has been lower in socialist regimes
than in market economies. After all, equality was what socialism was conceived to be
all about. Although the statistical evidence suggests that blue–collar workers were
comparatively better off in the former command economies than in market economies,
inequality levels for all workers were of similar magnitude in the former Eastern and
Western blocks (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992; Redor, 1992). Redor (1992)
argues that the former command economies exhibited educational wage premia and a
division of labour between managers and workers similar to those of market
economies. He even argues that the redistributive effect of benefits in kind in the
Visegrád countries1 has been no greater than in western countries (Redor, 1992,
p.182). However, the observed similarities of formerly eastern and western wage
distributions also stems from the welfare and minimum wage legislation introduced
particularly in western Europe.
Figure 1: Inequality in Poland and Britain 1956–1996
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
Year
D
ec
ile
 R
at
io
Britain
Poland II
Poland I
Note: Here and in the following, the Decile Ratio is the 90th percentile over the 10th percentile.
Sources: Polish series I and II up to 1989 and British series up to 1990: Atkinson and Micklewright
(1992); Polish series from 1990 up to 1995: Rocznik Statyczny 1996; British series from 1991 up
to 1996: New Earnings Survey 1996.
Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, at the end of the 1970s, Britain under Labour had a more
equal distribution of earnings (measured by the Decile Ratio) than the People’s
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 The Visegrád countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic.
2Republic of Poland. However, the Decile Ratios diverged thereafter with Britain
undergoing deregulatory pro–market reforms, and Poland seeing the effects of the
Gdansk Accord in 1980, when the Solidarity union managed to have a new wage
policy implemented. Balcerowicz’s ‘shock therapy’ approach to market reforms,
which started at the beginning of 1990, led to a significant increase in inequality, but
the change merely closed the gap between Britain and Poland. That is to say, contrary
to the fears of some observers, inequality did not soar above the levels observed in
western welfare states. At the same time, open unemployment in Poland increased
from 0% in 1990 to about 14% in 1992, which is only slightly above western
European levels. However, the share of the long–term unemployed in total
unemployment continued to increase to 40% in 1995 (Employment Observatory,
1995), which is high by any international comparison.
There are costs and benefits to wage liberalisation. The decline in real wages
experienced by most Polish workers during the transition process, as well as the
increase in inequality can endanger the transition process through political backlash
(Sachs, 1993). On the other hand, wages (prices) are important economic incentives
to adjust the economy to changing demands and eliminate the inefficiencies of the
socialist period. Economies with appropriate returns to skill will in the long run
acquire the right skills to be internationally competitive.
This paper investigates the distributional and structural development of hourly wages
in Poland between 1992 and 1995 on the basis of the Polish Labour Force Survey.
This period corresponds to the beginning of the second phase of the transition
process. Unfortunately, we do not have microeconomic data for the more turbulent
first phase of the transition period nor for the period before the transition. However,
Rutkowski (1996a) has analysed the Polish wage structure between 1987 and 1992
using individual data from a GUS (Poland’s Central Statistical Office) survey of
employers and the Household Budget Survey. Based on cross–tabulation evidence,
Rutkowski (1996a) concludes that there has been a huge rise in white–collar skills
and a considerable increase in the returns to education. He further finds that these
premia are much larger in the private than in the public sector. Rutkowski’s (1996a)
Mincerian (Mincer, 1974) regression results also point to higher returns to schooling
and experience in the private sector. In addition, there is slight evidence of a
moderate devaluation of work experience gained under the old regime. In sum, these
developments have led to an increase in inequality driven mainly by the dispersion of
white–collar workers. The distribution of blue–collar workers is found to have
become even more equal.
These general tendencies have also been observed for other countries in transition
(Rutkowski, 1996b). For the Czech republic Flanagan (1993) and Vecerník (1995)
observe falling returns to experience over the transition period, but rising returns to
education. For eastern Germany, Krueger and Pischke (1992) and Bird, Schwarze,
and Wagner (1994) find decreasing returns to experience, but stable returns to
3education. Steiner and Puhani (1997) mainly concur with these results but argue that
female work experience has not been devalued. Only Orazem and Vodopivec’s
(1995) results show rising returns to experience with Slovenian data. They attribute
this finding to the early retirement schemes which have made experienced labour
relatively scarce in Slovenia.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the development of the
inequality in hourly wages and offers a decomposition of this inequality into the
inequality within and between important socio–economic groups. In Section 3 we
estimate empirical wage functions, which allow us to decompose inequality changes
into the effects of changes in coefficients, observable and unobservable
characteristics, respectively. As Poland not only faces inequality in employment, but
also great inequality in access to employment, Section 4 tries to identify rigidities in
the Polish labour market. This is done by comparing changes in unemployment
probabilities with changes in wage premia, holding relevant demographic and socio–
economic characteristics constant. Section 5 concludes.
2 Wage Inequality 1992–1995
In the following we describe the developments of hourly wage inequality in Poland
between November 1992 and November 1995. Our data are from the corresponding
waves of the quarterly Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS), which is carried out by
the Central Statistical Office (GUS) of Poland as a representative sample of the Polish
population aged 15 and above. During the first four waves (May 1992 to February
1993) the PLFS has been conducted as a pure panel. Since then it has been a rotating
panel.2
We are interested in gross hourly wages, as we want to analyse the market
determinants of wages. However, the PLFS only provides information on net wages.
In the face of many people having additional jobs, it is important to notice that we
only observe the wage in a person’s main job. Part–time employees and self–
employed people are excluded from the sample as they do not give information on
their wages. To facilitate comparability, we inflate the wages for the years 1992 to
1994 using the Consumer Price Index3, so that everything is in 1995 old Polish Zlotys
(PLZ).
Figure 2 plots selected percentiles of real hourly wages for the years 1992 to 1995.
Neither for men nor for women can we observe a remarkable change in inequality. All
percentiles saw a fall in the real wage up until 1994 and a subsequent rise thereafter.
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 For more detail on the PLFS, see Szarkowski and Witkowski (1994).
3
 The Polish Consumer Price Index was taken from the Datastream International Data Bank,
London.
4However, these tendencies were most pronounced for the upper decile. On the other
hand, the less well–off amongst Polish workers seem to have a rather stable real
wage. The hypothesis of relative stability at the bottom of the wage distribution is
also substantiated by Rutkowski’s (1996a, p.94) evidence on the period between
1987 and 1992, who argues that the rich have been getting richer, but the poor have
not been not getting poorer.
Changes in inequality can also be summarised by standard statistical measures. We
report the Decile Ratio (here and in the following the ratio of the ninth over the first
decile), the Gini coefficient, and the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) in Table 1.
We report the developments for the public and the private sectors separately.4 The
Decile Ratio has the property that it is not sensitive to errors or real changes at the
tails of the distribution, whereas the Gini coefficient and MLD take into account all
observations. The Gini coefficient can be given the interpretation that if one randomly
draws two people from the population, then the expected wage difference between
those two people as a proportion of the average wage is twice the Gini coefficient
(Atkinson, 1983). To give an example, the Gini coefficient of 0.238 for men in 1992
of Table 1 says that the expected wage gap between two men chosen at random is
47.6 percent of the average wage.
Table 1 displays the inequality within and between important socio–economic groups
(Jenkins, 1995), which were classified into the following categories:
− education: 6 categories as in Table A2 of the appendix.
− occupation: 4 categories as in Table A2.
− work experience: 0–9; 10–19; 20–29; 30–39; over 40 years.
− industry: 10 categories as in Table A2 of the appendix.
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 Co–operatives are also included in the public sector, as they are not profit–maximising.
5Figure 2: Selected Percentiles of Real Hourly Wages 1992–1995
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6Table 1: Measures of Inequality: Within– and Between–Groups Decomposition
Decile Gini MLD Educ. Occup. W. Exp. Industry
Ratio Coeff. W B W B W B W B
All Men 1992 2.85 0.238 92 72 21 75 17 89 3 84 8
1993 2.79 0.238 91 73 18 75 16 89 2 86 5
1994 2.87 0.249 101 83 18 84 17 98 2 96 5
1995 2.84 0.249 99 77 22 79 20 96 3 95 5
Men 1992 2.88 0.237 91 70 21 74 17 89 2 80 11
Public 1993 2.82 0.236 89 71 18 74 15 87 1 82 6
Sector 1994 2.95 0.245 97 80 17 81 15 95 2 90 7
1995 2.91 0.244 95 77 19 78 17 93 2 89 6
Men 1992 2.81 0.241 96 77 19 79 17 89 6 92 3
Private 1993 2.81 0.243 97 78 19 80 17 93 4 94 3
Sector 1994 2.70 0.253 108 87 21 87 20 104 3 105 3
1995 2.68 0.246 100 73 27 77 24 96 4 98 3
All 1992 2.89 0.243 94 60 35 67 27 92 2 82 13
Women 1993 2.76 0.239 91 60 31 67 24 89 2 80 11
1994 2.73 0.233 88 58 30 65 23 86 1 80 8
1995 2.80 0.236 89 57 32 63 26 87 2 79 10
Women 1992 2.88 0.243 94 57 37 66 28 92 2 80 14
Public 1993 2.67 0.235 88 55 33 64 24 87 1 76 12
Sector 1994 2.67 0.227 81 52 29 60 21 81 1 74 8
1995 2.73 0.232 85 53 33 62 23 85 1 76 9
Women 1992 2.77 0.240 93 74 19 72 21 89 4 86 7
Private 1993 2.86 0.253 104 82 22 79 25 98 6 94 10
Sector 1994 2.58 0.247 107 77 30 79 27 103 3 98 9
1995 2.57 0.233 90 67 23 65 25 85 4 85 5
Note: MLD n y MLDii k kk
within
k kk
between
    1 1a f b g b glog log   
     
, where
n sample size y hourly wage
i index for individual νk sample share of kth group
k index for group λk µk / µ
µ average hourly wage.
In the table, MLD is multiplied by 1,000. Due to rounding errors the sum of the components of
MLD is not always equal to MLD. ‘W’ stands for the within, ‘B’, for the between MLD.
Source: PLFS; own calculations.
7As we do not observe work experience directly for all waves in the PLFS, we
guesstimate this variable by age minus age at completion of education. In case of
people with a previous unemployment spell, we subtract one year of work experience.
For men, we subtract two further years to account for mandatory military service, but
only one year for university graduates, as they traditionally serve for a shorter period
in Poland. For women, we subtract one year for each child. Unfortunately, years of
schooling also have to be inferred from the educational categories in the survey. We
have made the following assumptions on age after having completed education
(assumed age in brackets): higher (24), post–secondary (21), secondary general (20),
secondary vocational (19), basic vocational (17), primary (15), and less than primary
(14).
As to the occupation and industry classifications, it is important to note that these
have changed in the PLFS over the observation period. Therefore, we have re–
classified occupations and industries into broader categories in order to improve the
comparability over time (see Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix). In the case of
industrial categories, the PLFS fortunately offers both classifications (old and new) in
the 1993 wave. Table A5 in the appendix shows that the means of our broader
categories are not much affected by whether we use the old or new classification. We
can only hope that the same holds for occupations.
Although the MLDs and Gini coefficients in Table 1 show small increases in
inequality of male hourly wages between 1992 and 1995, the Decile Ratio exhibits no
change. For women, we even observe a small fall in inequality. For men, inequality
peaks for all groups in 1994, as also reported in OECD (1997). This relative stability
of wage inequality over time is maintained if we look at the whole work force, i.e.
men and women together. Compared to other countries in transition, wage inequality
in Poland is now lower than in Hungary or the Czech republic, but higher than in
Slovakia (Pudney, 1993; Rutkowski, 1996b). In general, inequality levels in the
Visegrád countries are now within the range of those in western Europe, yet
European wage inequality levels are lower than the U.S. one (the U.S. had a Decile
Ratio of 4.39 in 1995, see OECD, 1996).
One might expect greater wage inequality in the public sector with some people
making a lot of money in modern businesses and others scraping by in simple
services. It is interesting, though, to observe that in contrast to Rutkowski’s (1996a)
results on monthly earnings, this expectation cannot be confirmed by the data, neither
for men nor for women. One reason for this finding is that people work longer hours
in the private sector (monthly wage inequality is higher in the public than in the
private sector).
As to the decomposition of MLD into the inequality within and between important
socio–economic characteristics, we find there has been little change over the
observation period concerning the shares of these two inequalities if one decomposes
according to educational categories. However, if one looks at the public and private
8sectors separately, one observes that for both sexes, the share of the between
inequality has increased in the private sector, which is consistent with rising
educational premia (cf. Rutkowski, 1996a). The same is found if we decompose
according to occupational groups in the private sector, which is consistent with rising
white–collar premia (cf. Rutkowski, 1996a). By contrast, for males, the share of the
inequality between work–experience categories has fallen, especially in the private
sector. Again this is consistent with falling returns to experience, as found in most
studies on eastern Europe (see the references cited in the Introduction). Also, the
share of the inequality between industrial sectors has decreased, but here the fall is
most pronounced in the public sector rather than the private sector.
To sum up, the inequality measures and their composition gives credence to the view
that the Polish transition process is characterised by an increase in educational and
occupational premia and a devaluation of work experience. The development seems
to be driven mostly by the private sector. Furthermore, the inequality between
industrial sectors has decreased, which is what one might expect in well–functioning
labour markets after the removal of the socialist regime which had a preference for
industrial production over services. In order to make more determinate assertions on
the effect of various demographic and socio–economic characteristics on Polish
wages, though, an econometric analysis is called for, which we now turn to.
3 The Polish Wage Structure 1992–1995
3.1 Theoretical and Econometric Issues
Because of the potential effect of industry affiliation as well as regional factors on
wages in Poland, we do not consider a pure human capital interpretation (Mincer,
1974) as a suitable explanation of the Polish wage structure in transition. Apart from
human capital indicators, we include the industrial sector and the size of the place of
residence into our empirical wage equations. In addition, the regional (voivodship)
unemployment rate is taken as a proxy for regional aggregate demand factors. As we
only have net wages and the Polish income taxation system incorporates joint taxation
and child allowances (Bialobreski, 1991), we also have to include relevant household
characteristics into the equation.
This is unfortunate as the inclusion of these variables heavily undermines our ability
to correct for sample selection (Heckman, 1979). As Leung and Yu (1996) and many
others have demonstrated, collinearity problems often arise when effective exclusion
restrictions cannot be implemented (see Puhani, 1997, for a short survey).
Collinearity can raise the mean square error of the two–step or full–information
maximum likelihood estimators way above the one of the OLS estimator. In fact, we
cannot find any economically meaningful exclusion restrictions in the data set at hand.
Hence, we choose to estimate all wage equations without correcting for selectivity
bias.
93.2 Estimation Results
Tables 2 and 3 report estimation results of our empirical wage equations for men and
women, respectively. Sample means of the reported variables are found in Table A2
of the appendix. We estimate the equations separately for the public and the private
sector for the years 1992 and 1995, respectively. Over those three years, the share of
private–sector employment in our sample rose from 21 to 34 percent for men and
from 16 to 25 percent for women. As the R2 statistics show, the share of the
explained variance is lower for men than for women and higher for the public than the
private sector. In addition, R2 falls over time. These results are not unexpected. As
Table A2 of the appendix shows, women are compared to men far more likely to be
employed in industries like health care and education where wages are often set
according to measurable characteristics like age, education, work experience, or
occupation. Therefore, the higher R2 for women comes as no surprise. The fall of the
employment share in these sectors as well as their comparatively low share in the
private sector can account for the variation of the R2 over time and between sectors.
The estimated variance of hourly wages due to unobserved individual factors shows
little variation over sex, time, or sector of employment. However, one can say that
unobserved individual factors, like work motivation, are slightly more important in the
private than in the public sector. In general, though, the evidence does not point to
large changes in the influence of unobserved individual characteristics on the Polish
wage structure.
Tables 2 and 3 show the impacts of observed individual characteristics on male and
female wages, respectively. In the following discussion, we will focus on the aspects
we find most striking. Table 4 gives test results on the equality of coefficients across
time, sector of employment, and sex. To give an example, the joint test for the
equality of coefficients for the years 1992 and 1995 is carried out by pooling the
observations of both years and jointly estimating separate coefficients for each
variable and year. We then test for the joint equality of the education, work
experience, occupation, industry and place of residence dummies, respectively. The
test results will be mentioned in the following discussions of the effects of various
socio–economic characteristics on hourly wages in Poland.
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Table 2: Estimated Earnings Functions for Men (see Table A6 for omitted output)
Variable Public Sector Private Sector
1992 t 1995 t 1992 t 1995 t
education (basic vocational)
   higher 0.351 15.40 0.295 12.21 0.297 5.61 0.441 9.34
   post–secondary 0.083 2.27 0.148 3.85 0.216 2.11 0.079 0.95
   secondary vocational 0.058 4.55 0.050 3.74 0.086 3.23 0.076 4.00
   secondary general 0.065 2.25 0.057 2.03 –0.041 –0.48 0.136 2.63
   primary or less –0.082 –6.23 –0.112 –7.68 –0.093 –3.80 –0.103 –5.90
work experience 0.007 3.89 0.008 4.29 0.015 4.30 0.009 3.59
work experience^2/100 –0.014 –3.25 –0.019 –3.94 –0.035 –3.71 –0.022 –3.45
occupation (blue collar)
   manager 0.168 8.85 0.276 10.30 0.282 5.87 0.265 5.79
   professional 0.071 4.05 0.136 7.89 0.172 3.22 0.109 3.26
   white–collar –0.045 –2.59 –0.035 –2.00 –0.034 –0.79 –0.002 –0.07
industry (mining, manuf.)
   agriculture, forestry, fishing –0.248 –14.79 –0.258 –11.20 –0.165 –2.00 –0.156 –4.41
   construction –0.043 –2.58 0.024 1.14 0.067 3.12 –0.044 –0.56
   trade, repairs –0.164 –6.41 –0.162 –7.47 –0.060* –1.76 0.011 0.72
   transport, communication –0.096 –6.92 –0.194 –3.43 0.098* 1.95 –0.204 –3.37
   financial intermediation 0.105 1.98 –0.162 –11.36 0.220 1.55 0.008 0.19
   health care, social work –0.140 –6.08 –0.169 –7.38 0.120* 1.79 0.075 0.54
   science, education & arts –0.074 –3.40 –0.048 –2.77 –0.125 –1.31 –0.044 –0.29
   (public) administration 0.156 8.28 –0.229 –7.16 –0.125 –0.74 –0.077 –1.40
   other -0.029* –1.82 –0.232 –15.56 0.050 1.46 –0.099 –5.00
unemployed before –0.171 –7.63 –0.167 –11.05 –0.065 –2.64 –0.121 –8.65
assigned to a disability group –0.273 –6.16 –0.136 –2.73 –0.201 –2.57 –0.138 –2.57
place of residence (rural)
   100,000 inhabitants or more 0.164 14.33 0.147 11.61 0.171 7.38 0.072 4.06
   20,000 to 99,999 0.079 6.32 0.112 8.94 0.078 2.95 0.052 2.93
   19,999 or less 0.020 1.39 0.000 –0.03 0.020 0.70 –0.008 –0.43
voivodship unempl. rate –0.003 –2.32 –0.006 –4.05 –0.005 –2.05 –0.008 –4.15
R2 0.361 0.357 0.310 0.320
 2 0.336 0.342 0.357 0.344
# observations 6,143 5,531 1,585 2,873
Table 3: Estimated Earnings Functions for Women (see Table A7 for omitted output)
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Variable Public Sector Private Sector
1992 t 1995 t 1992 t 1995 t
education (basic vocational)
   higher 0.530 25.62 0.515 25.25 0.302 4.95 0.432 9.05
   post–secondary 0.244 11.75 0.253 13.04 0.223 3.29 0.179 5.14
   secondary vocational 0.118 8.46 0.121 8.82 0.142 4.72 0.074 3.66
   secondary general 0.109 6.48 0.161 9.42 0.158 3.89 0.123 4.75
   primary or less –0.096 –6.53 –0.084 –5.52 –0.086 –2.40 –0.035 –1.32
work experience 0.014 8.02 0.009 5.05 0.010 2.10 0.010 3.40
work experience^2/100 –0.023 –5.44 –0.009 –2.13 –0.026 –2.08 –0.023 –2.83
occupation (blue collar)
   manager 0.290 12.81 0.287 11.45 0.341 4.99 0.312 4.62
   professional 0.196 11.57 0.197 12.35 0.190 3.95 0.241 6.95
   white–collar 0.056 4.20 0.064 4.77 –0.042 –1.23 0.010 0.40
industry (mining, manuf.)
   agriculture, forestry, fishing –0.143 –5.30 –0.158 –4.89 0.019 0.13 –0.080 –1.23
   construction –0.081 –2.26 0.159 3.72 –0.086 –1.30 –0.066 –0.88
   trade, repairs –0.123 –6.82 –0.186 –4.57 –0.093 –2.88 –0.088 –1.58
   transport, communication 0.000 –0.02 –0.113 –3.58 0.041 0.55 –0.153 –3.84
   financial intermediation 0.158 6.03 –0.014 –0.79 0.239 3.12 0.043 0.63
   health care, social work –0.072 –5.28 –0.004 –0.26 –0.045 –0.39 –0.025 –0.28
   science, education & arts 0.054 3.65 0.022 1.24 0.070 0.46 0.184 2.56
   (public) administration 0.087 4.57 –0.082 –3.08 –0.063 –0.30 –0.014 –0.23
   other 0.013 0.66 –0.140 –11.21 0.018 0.41 –0.125 –5.08
unemployed before –0.132 –5.23 –0.071 –5.41 –0.134 –3.91 –0.087 –5.57
assigned to a disability group –0.089 –1.32 –0.024 –0.48 –0.195 –0.92 –0.177 –3.02
place of residence (rural)
   100,000 inhabitants or more 0.080 7.00 0.034 2.93 0.125 4.16 0.086 4.16
   20,000 to 99,999 0.041 3.43 0.032 2.83 0.059* 1.66 0.001 0.07
   19,999 or less 0.032 2.26 0.014 1.16 –0.008 –0.21 –0.014 –0.57
voivodship unempl. rate 0.000 0.03 0.000 0.38 –0.002 –0.71 –0.003 –1.29
R2 0.474 0.455 0.341 0.381
 2 0.305 0.295 0.345 0.315
# observations 5,281 5,338 993 1,825
Notes to Table 2 and Table 3: (1) The dependent variable is the logarithm of the real hourly wage
(in 1995 Old PLZ).
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(2) The columns beneath the years (e.g., 1992) report the coefficients. The dependent variable is the
logarithm of the hourly wage.
(3) Shaded (asterisked) coefficients are significant at the 5 (10) percent level.
Source: PLFS; own calculations.
• As can be seen from Tables 2 and 3, there is a high wage premium on completed
higher education over basic vocational education. This is also found by Jedrzejczak
(1994). Because of the semi–logarithmic specification, small coefficients can be
interpreted as the approximate ceteris paribus wage differential with respect to the
base category. The exact interpretation of, say, the higher–education premium for
men employed in the private sector in 1995 (cf. last column of Table 2) is given by
exp .4410 1 100 a f , which corresponds to 57.18 percent. For both men and women, the
higher–education premium increased significantly (both in the colloquial and in the
statistical sense) between 1992 and 1995 in the private sector. However, in contrast
to men, the higher–education premium for women in the private sector was still lower
than the one in the public sector in 1995.
Table 4 reports test results on the equality of all educational dummies across time,
sector of employment, and sex. On the whole, we find no change over time for men,
but significant changes for women. By 1995, the differences between the public and
the private sector are significant at the 10 percent level for both sexes. Whereas the
private sector shows no difference in the educational premia between men and
women, the public sector does. If we also look at the tests for equality of the sexes
for the other variables in Table 4, we see that the equality of male and female
coefficients is a general result for the private sector whereas inequality is a general
result for the public sector. This evidence supports the view that the transition process
to a market economy improves the equality of the sexes, which is also found by
Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) for Slovenia.
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Table 4: Tests of the Equality of Coefficients between Years, Sector of Ownership, and Sex
(Tables 2 and 3)
Year Sex Sector of Empl. Educ. Exp Occ. Ind. Pl. of
Res.
All
1992/95 Males Public – – + + + +
Private – – – + + +
Females Public + (+) – + + +
Private + – – + – +
1992 Males Public / Private – + – + – +
Females Public / Private + + (+) – – +
1995 Males Public / Private (+) – – + + +
Females Public / Private (+) + (+) + + +
1992 Males / Females Public + + + + + +
Males / Females Private – – – – – +
1995 Males / Females Public + + + + + +
Males / Females Private – – + – – +
Notes: (1) The tests are for the equality of the coefficients between the categories separated by a
slash ‘ / ’ in columns 1 to 3. That is to say, the first, second, and third blocks test the equality of the
coefficients between the years, sectors of employment, and sexes, respectively.
(2) ‘All’ means the equality of all coefficients included in the regressions of Table 2 and Table 3
(including the coefficients reported in the appendix) is tested.
(3) A ‘+’ [‘(+)’] sign indicates that the coefficients are significantly different from each other at the
5 [10] percent level.
Source: PLFS; own calculations.
• As the test results of Table 4 show, only for women in the public sector has there
been a slight devaluation of work experience over time, which is significant only at
the 10 percent level. In Figure A in the appendix, we plot the experience–wage
profiles estimated by Rutkowski (1996a) for the years 1987 and 1992. It is shown
that there has been a slight devaluation of experience in the first phase of transition
(the profiles have been estimated jointly for men and women). As can be seen,
Rutkowski’s (1996a) profiles for 1992 are much steeper than ours. The reason is
probably that we include more variables (e.g. occupation, industry) into our wage
equation. Such differences have also occurred elsewhere in the empirical literature:
for eastern Germany, Bird, Schwarze, and Wagner (1994) estimate flatter profiles
than Krueger and Pischke (1992), which they attribute to their more detailed
specification of explanatory variables.
As can be seen from the tests in Table 4, experience–wage profiles differ between the
public and the private sector (except for males in 1995). As already mentioned above,
differences between the sexes can only be observed in the public sector. Taking into
account these test results, we plot the relevant experience–wage profiles in Figure 3.
The inversely U–shaped form over the life cycle is consistent with human capital
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theory (see, e.g., Mincer 1974; Franz, 1991; Polachek and Siebert, 1993). Whereas
experience–wage profiles for men are steeper in the private sector than in the public
sector, we find no change over time (see Table 4). A possible explanation for the
steeper profiles in the private sector may be a selection effect. The more dynamic
private sector is likely to attract the more flexible and able workers away from the
public sector by paying them the appropriate rents on their human capital. This
explanation is not inconsistent with the fact that, on average, the private sector is
paying lower wages (see Table A2).
Things are rather different with female experience–wage profiles, though. Here, in
contrast to the evidence for men, the profiles are steeper in the public than in the
private sector. The reason may be similar to the one mentioned above in this section,
namely the high employment share in industries like health care and education with
institutionalised wage profiles. The fact that the experience–wage profile in the public
sector has flattened somewhat between 1992 and 1995 indicates that the public sector
is at least marginally responding to movements in the private market sector. As there
is hardly any downturn of the profile with increasing experience, though, one might
be suspicious whether the depreciation of human capital over the life cycle is
adequately acknowledged in public–sector wage setting.
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Figure 3: Estimated Experience–Wage Profiles
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• Male managers and professionals earned higher premia in relation to blue–collar
workers in 1995 than in 1992. Otherwise, occupational differentials have not changed
significantly over the observation period (cf. Table 4). We observe no wage premium
of white–collar over blue–collar workers, except for women in the public sector.
Various factors can account for this. There may be compensating differentials for
usually more dangerous and physically more challenging blue–collar work. Union
strongholds in typical blue–collar jobs are also possible explanations. Although
unions are not that predominant in the newly developing private sector, one should be
aware that recently privatised firms are likely to keep many public–sector institutional
structures, including union influence. Unfortunately, we are not able to identify
employment in recently privatised firms in our data set. Although Rutkowski (1996a)
shows that the wage gap between white–collar and blue–collar workers has increased
remarkably between 1987 and 1993 by comparing median earnings, we find no such
gap in the regression results for the subsequent period we analyse here. However,
Rutkowski (1996a) uses a different data set and looks at gross monthly earnings,
whereas we analyse net hourly wages. Further, and probably most importantly, we
keep the distinction between professionals and white–collar workers as proposed in
the PLFS. Rutkowski’s (1996a) data set uses a different classification, where
professionals and other white–collar workers are grouped into one category.
• In competitive labour markets, persistent non–compensating inter–industry wage
differentials should be nonexistent. In the transition context, however, we are likely to
observe inter–industry wage differentials as disequilibrium phenomena. Growing
industries will pay higher wages than shrinking ones thus attracting labour into more
productive uses. The estimation results show that wages are amongst the lowest in
agriculture, where Poland has an extremely high employment share (27 percent in
1995), which is more than twice as large as in other countries with a comparative
advantage in agriculture like New Zealand or Ireland (OECD, 1997). The problems in
the Polish housing market (OECD, 1997, Steiner and Kwiatkowski, 1995) probably
hamper the movement of workers from rural agricultural areas into cities. Therefore,
the negative wage differential for agriculture comes as no surprise. We come back to
the results on the inter–industry wage differentials in Section 4.
• The just–mentioned rigidities in the Polish housing market are also likely to explain
part of the wage differentials between various place–of–residence categories. Hourly
wages in big cities are significantly higher than in rural areas, especially for men. The
fact that the estimated wage differentials are much smaller for women than for men
may well be the result of a selection effect. Women in rural areas with lower average
wages have fewer incentives to accept work than women in big cities. Similarly, the
zero elasticity of female wages with respect to the voivodship unemployment rate
could also be explained by selection effects. For men, this elasticity is negative and
significant. In 1995, a 1 percentage point increase in the voivodship unemployment
rate led to a reduction of 0.6 and 0.8 percent of the average hourly wage in the public
and private sector, respectively.
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The issue of wage flexibility will be further discussed in Section 4. Before that, we
will in the following subsection use the estimation results of Tables 2 and 3 to gain a
deeper insight into the inequality changes discussed in Section 2 above.
3.3 Forces Behind Inequality Changes
Following Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), and Blau and Kahn (1996) we
decompose the changes in inequality between 1992 and 1995 into a characteristics
effect, a coefficients effect, and a residual effect. The characteristics effect describes
the change in inequality resulting from changes in the composition of observed
characteristics over time, whereas the coefficients effect describes the change in
inequality resulting from changes in the coefficients on observed characteristics.
Finally, the residual effect is the change in inequality due to changes in the
composition or the effects of unobserved characteristics. These  effects can be
identified by comparing the distributions of the following variables:
y i
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92 92 92 92 92,
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/
'   β x  [3.1]
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1 92 95 92 95,
/
,
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2 95 95 92 95,
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s p
i
s p
95 95 95 95 95,
/
,
/
'   β x  , where E tbg 0 and   t t 1 . [3.4]
The characteristics, coefficients, and residual effects are the differences in the
distributions between [3.1] and [3.2], [3.2] and [3.3], and [3.3] and [3.4],
respectively. Depending on whether a person is employed in the public or private
sector, we use the public– or private–sector coefficient and error variance for the
corresponding observation. This way, a move from the public to the private sector is
counted as a change in an observed characteristic.
Table 5 shows that although overall changes in inequality as measured by the Decile
Ratio were rather modest, the underlying changes in coefficients over time, as well as
the mobility between observed characteristics had a larger impact on inequality. In
particular, changes in coefficients led to an increase in inequality for both men and
women, yet overall inequality changed less, because the change in observed
characteristics had a decreasing impact on inequality. This is probably due to the
increasing share of private–sector employment, where wage inequality measured by
the Decile Ratio is lower than in the public sector (cf. Table 1). Steiner and Wagner
(1996) report similar results for western Germany in the 1980s: there was hardly a
change in overall inequality, but there were underlying changes due to changes in
coefficients and observed characteristics, which more or less cancelled each other
out.
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Table 5: Decomposition of the Change in Wage Inequality
Men Women
1992 1995 1992 1995
Decile Ratio (cf. Table 1) 2.85 2.84 2.89 2.80
∆ Decile Ratio –0.004 –0.088
Characteristics Effect –0.040 –0.114
Coefficients Effect 0.049 0.095
Residual Effect –0.013 –0.068
Source: PLFS; own calculations.
The conclusion from this subsection is therefore that the forces working in the Polish
labour market have a greater potential effect on inequality than the mere
contemplation of inequality changes as carried out in Section 2 suggests. This finding
can have important implications for the expectation of future inequality changes. In
particular, we have seen that the trend in the revaluation of crucial labour market
characteristics (changes in coefficients) works in favour of an increase in inequality.
To see whether these changes have been adequate, we compare the changes in wage
premia for certain socio–economic characteristics with the changes in the effect of
these characteristics on the unemployment probability in the following section. This
way, we hope to identify rigidities in the Polish labour market.
4 Rigidities in the Polish Labour Market
Labour market rigidities can arise through efficiency wages (Weiss, 1991), the impact
of trade unions, incomes policies, or restrictions to mobility due to failures in the
housing market.
Poland has two main trade unions, the anti–communist Solidarity (Solidarnosc) and
the post–communist OPZZ (Opólnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazó Zawodowych).
While Solidarity is mainly found in large state enterprises in heavy industry, the
OPZZ is more concentrated in the service sector. Wage bargaining in Poland is
undertaken on a national level by a tripartite commission consisting of the
government, trade unions, and employers. However, the agreements of the national
commission are only recommendations for the collective bargaining parties at the firm
level. Therefore, actual wages are bargained over at the firm level between trade
unions and employers. Union power is strengthened, though, by the fact that
agreements reached between employers and unions are also binding for non–union
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members. However, whereas the unions are strongly represented in the private as well
as the privatised sector, the unionisation rate in the private sector is very low.5
As the OECD (1997) and Steiner and Kwiatkowski (1995) point out, heavy
subsidisation of communal rents as well as the poor housing infrastructure are
amongst the main obstacles to worker mobility in Poland. In addition, the transport
infrastructure cannot compensate these deficiencies.
With the implementation of the stabilisation plan in 1990, Poland introduced a tax–
based incomes policy, ‘popiwek’, which helped to keep average real wages in check
(Hagemejer, 1995). This policy, as efficiency wages and union power, might render
the Polish wage structure inefficient by distorting relative wages between socio–
economic subgroups. Flanagan (1995) argues for the Czech Republic that the wage
rules adopted due to incomes policies there lead to a compression of the wage
structure which causes unemployment by preventing relative wage adjustment.
In order to identify ceteris paribus unemployment probabilities for socio–economic
subgroups, we estimate the labour force state (employed, unemployed, not
participating) by way of multinomial logit models in Tables 6 and 7 for men and
women, respectively.6 To quantify the effects of explanatory variables, we calculate
relative odds ratios (RORs), which are reported in the tables. To give an example for
the purpose of interpretation, a relative odds ratio of 2.366 in Table 7 in the column
‘Unemployed’ for women aged between 16 and 25 means that
Pr & / Pr &
Pr & / Pr &
unemployed age employed age
unemployed age employed age
16 25 16 25
36 45 36 45
   
   
a f a f
a f a f= 2.366,
where Pr stands for probability. Therefore, if a woman with otherwise the same
characteristics as the reference person falls into the age group 16 to 25, her odds for
unemployment against employment will be 136.6 percent higher than if she was in the
age group 36 to 45.
• For the purpose of comparability with other studies we have chosen to include work
experience instead of age into our empirical wage equations. We therefore cannot
directly compare the coefficients on the age dummies with corresponding coefficients
in the estimation of the labour force state. Nevertheless, it is shown that young
women have had a very high probability of being unemployed both in 1992 and in
                                        
5
 I thank Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, University of Lodz, for helpful discussions on the Polish
collective bargaining system.
6
 As people without previous work history do not have information on their occupation nor
industry, we group them together with blue-collar workers, and the industry others, unknown,
respectively. An alternative would have been to exclude them from the sample. Both procedures
yield the same qualitative results on occupations and industries, though.
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1995 (cf. Table 7). This is in itself an indication for a rigidity in the labour market.
For the market to clear, wages for women with little work experience should fall,
however, we observe hardly any change in the experience wage profile for either men
or women (see Figure 3 above).
• There is a slight rise in the relative unemployment probability of both men and
women with primary or less education. Table 2 shows that at least relative wages of
men in this educational group have been adjusted downward to account for this
development.
• A very clear picture emerges by looking at blue–collar workers. Clearly, they are
most likely to be unemployed relative to all other occupational categories. This gap
has even increased significantly (both in the statistical and the colloquial sense)
between 1992 and 1995 for both men and women. However, as can readily be seen
from Tables 2 and 3, the small ceteris paribus wage gap between female blue–collar
and white–collar workers in 1992 has even been closed by 1995. In the case of men,
white–collar workers, holding everything else constant, earned even slightly less than
blue–collar workers in 1992, but caught up by 1995. A natural explanation for this
wage rigidity is that blue–collar workers are more unionised than white–collar
workers and can therefore keep relatively high wages, although this hypothesis cannot
be tested using our data. As blue–collar workers had a special status in communist
ideology, blue–collar workers in Poland did not have to fight for a change (increase)
in their relative wages in order to reach the current status quo, but only had to resist a
change, namely falls in relative wages. The social and political difficulty of agreeing
on a negative change can explain why this wage rigidity can be so persistent.
• Industries for which the unemployment probability has increased over the
observation period are construction, administration (for both sexes), transport and
communication (especially for men), as well as trade and repairs for women.7 By
1995, though, both male and female construction workers earn – ceteris paribus –
amongst the highest wages of all industries, both in the public and the private sector
(only women in science, education and arts in the private sector earn more). Here
increasing unemployment has not led wages to adjust. Things are different with
wages in administration, transport and communication, and to some degree in trade
and repairs (for women), as the relative wage positions of these industries have fallen.
As far as mining and manufacturing (the base category) is concerned, wages in this
                                        
7
 The extremely high estimated relative odds ratio (ROR) for women in the industry trade and
repairs (31.83), comes as no surprise: in the total female sample, about 9% are unemployed,
51% are employed and 40% are not participating. However, in trade and repairs, the
corresponding figures are 30%, 13%, and 57%, respectively. It follows that the odds ratio for
unemployment over employment is about 0.16 for the total sample and about 2.13 for trade and
repairs, respectively. Hence we get a relative odds ratio of 2.13 / 0.16 = 14.44 from cross
tabulation. This increases to our estimate of 31.83 under the ceteris paribus condition.
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category are high relative to other industries, even more so in 1995 than in 1992. As
mining and manufacturing is also among the industries with comparatively high
unemployment rates, we may conclude that there is some wage rigidity in this sector,
which may be explained by union influence, although this cannot be tested here.
• Place–of–residence wage differentials have disappeared by 1995, which suggests
that there might have been an improvement in worker mobility between 1992 and
1995. This improvement in worker mobility could be the result of a more efficient
housing market, or cuts in the generosity of the unemployment benefit system
(Puhani, 1996).
To sum up, there is significant evidence for labour market rigidities in Poland. In
particular, blue–collar workers as well as workers in the industries mining,
manufacturing, and construction have kept or improved their relative wage position
between 1992 and 1995, although unemployment has risen for these people. From an
efficiency point of view, wages seem too high for these groups.
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Table 6: Estimates of the Labour Force State for Men (see Table A8 for omitted output)
Variable 1992 1992 1995 1995
ROR U t ROR N t ROR U t ROR N t
age between (36 and 45)
   16 and 25 1.099 1.03 3.965 12.85 1.435 3.91 2.664 9.71
   26 and 35 0.893 –1.44 0.791 –2.02 1.041 0.50 0.552 –5.56
   46 and 55 0.972 –0.27 2.221 7.92 1.155 1.49 1.739 6.36
   56 and 65 1.190 1.23 12.637 23.25 1.071 0.45 9.970 23.78
education (basic vocational)
   higher 0.688 –2.37 0.895 –0.75 0.591 –2.83 0.677 –2.86
   post–secondary 0.826 –0.70 1.319 1.07 1.044 0.17 0.830 –0.69
   secondary vocational 0.953 –0.60 1.274 2.73 0.835 –2.25 1.354 3.95
   secondary general 0.939 –0.38 3.003 8.20 0.980 –0.12 2.567 7.87
   primary or less 0.989 –0.15 2.840 15.69 1.141 1.96 3.532 21.01
occupation (blue–collar, unkn.)
   manager 0.671 –2.88 0.889 –0.91 0.372 –5.92 0.394 –7.21
   professional 0.677 –2.81 0.704 –2.70 0.369 –7.00 0.652 –4.14
   white–collar 0.696 –2.78 0.434 –5.57 0.459 –7.34 0.263 –12.17
industry (mining, manuf.)
   agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.455 –7.59 0.180 16.17 0.183 –14.55 0.084 –26.46
   construction 1.824 7.04 1.238 2.00 8.179 21.87 5.457 15.74
   trade, repairs 1.366 2.55 0.837 –1.16 1.192* 1.87 0.923 –0.75
   transport, communication 0.862 –1.17 1.264* 1.95 12.432 14.84 9.763 13.12
   financial intermediation 0.206 –1.55 0.285 –1.48 0.054 –7.59 0.050 –9.69
   health care, social work 0.832 –0.76 0.331 –3.60 0.485 –2.96 0.257 –6.21
   science, education & arts 0.883 –0.61 0.981 –0.11 0.564 –2.86 0.576 –3.21
   (public) administration 1.027 0.15 2.141 4.79 3.501 9.32 2.691 7.21
   other, unknown 3.575 15.87 10.173 31.03 1.778 7.51 2.877 15.38
unemployed before 4.755 22.23 0.526 –4.63 2.429 14.48 0.584 –6.55
assigned to a disability group 2.122 6.58 18.463 37.73 1.917 5.85 18.457 41.91
place of residence (rural)
   100,000 inhabitants or more 1.109 1.38 1.244 2.98 0.962 –0.52 1.259 3.48
   20,000 to 99,999 1.402 4.21 1.492 4.99 1.071 0.93 1.277 3.55
   19,999 or less 1.289 2.90 1.535 4.88 1.096 1.11 1.228 2.57
voivodship unemployment rate 1.085 11.26 1.040 5.23 1.096 12.29 1.046 6.55
log likelihood –9,596.69 –11,009.66
Pseudo R2 0.393 0.417
# observations 18,982 22,064
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Table 7: Estimates of the Labour Force State for Women (see Table A9 for omitted output)
Variable 1992 1992 1995 1995
ROR U t ROR N t ROR U t ROR N t
age between (36 and 45)
   16 and 25 2.366 9.04 7.672 24.63 2.460 9.33 8.884 27.64
   26 and 35 1.556 5.91 3.138 16.33 1.466 5.16 2.509 14.44
   46 and 55 1.221* 1.85 2.736 12.25 0.932 –0.70 1.901 9.03
   56 and 65 1.067 0.37 19.406 31.66 0.503 –3.36 12.794 29.89
education (basic vocational)
   higher 0.518 –3.90 0.612 –3.99 0.440 –4.51 0.572 –5.18
   post–secondary 0.719 –2.19 0.727 –2.59 0.898 –0.73 0.672 –3.32
   secondary vocational 0.935 –0.84 0.921 –1.11 1.066 0.84 0.947 –0.84
   secondary general 0.924 –0.78 1.373 3.71 1.106 1.04 1.611 6.43
   primary or less 0.705 –4.29 1.854 9.39 0.934 –0.88 2.409 15.09
occupation (blue–collar, unkn.)
   manager 0.269 –7.28 0.463 –6.08 0.097 –10.30 0.090 –16.31
   professional 0.460 –6.76 0.648 –4.79 0.162 –17.36 0.175 –23.57
   white–collar 0.584 –5.99 0.541 –8.28 0.259 –17.13 0.216 –25.27
industry (mining, manuf.)
   agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.176 13.29 0.118 –23.13 0.094 –18.79 0.037 –36.57
   construction 1.995 3.73 1.351* 1.75 6.116 9.26 4.080 7.85
   trade, repairs 1.328 2.80 1.132 1.43 31.830 28.19 37.029 32.48
   transport, communication 0.801 –1.29 0.872 –1.00 1.548 2.35 2.133 5.43
   financial intermediation 0.429 –3.23 0.583 –2.77 0.326 –4.62 0.309 –6.76
   health care, social work 0.449 –5.51 0.664 –4.09 0.763 –2.15 0.798 –2.48
   science, education & arts 0.457 –5.65 0.709 –3.54 1.282* 1.67 1.760 5.33
   (public) administration 0.552 –3.04 0.699 –2.40 1.663 2.86 1.480 2.63
   other, unknown 5.587 20.22 13.040 36.36 0.925 –0.99 1.391 5.66
unemployed before 5.935 21.79 0.744 –2.63 2.074 11.38 0.584 –8.42
assigned to a disability group 2.394 6.70 10.957 30.67 2.066 5.79 11.692 34.71
place of residence (rural)
   100,000 inhabitants or more 1.119 1.49 1.077 1.22 0.886 –1.62 1.241 3.88
   20,000 to 99,999 1.316 3.39 1.207 2.83 1.021 0.28 1.071 1.18
   19,999 or less 1.112 1.17 0.983 –0.23 1.074 0.86 0.976 –0.36
voivodship unemployment  rate 1.080 10.26 1.034 5.36 1.060 7.86 1.016 2.75
log likelihood –11,583.41 –13,624.44
Pseudo R2 0.369 0.372
# observations 19,762 23,452
Note to Tables 6 and 7: ROR U and ROR N stand for the relative odds ratio for unemployed and
not participating, respectively.
Source: PLFS; own calculations.
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5 Conclusions
We have analysed the Polish wage and unemployment structure between 1992 and
1995 on the basis of the Polish Labour Force Survey. In particular, we looked at the
development of inequality measures, considering men and women, and the public and
private sector separately. We also decomposed the inequality measures into inequality
within and between important socio–economic groups. The following estimates of
empirical wage equations allowed us to track the development of the impact of
important socio–economic characteristics on hourly wages in Poland. Additionally, by
estimating unemployment probabilities by way of multinomial logit models of the
labour force state, we were able to compare changes in ceteris paribus
unemployment probabilities with changes in wage differentials. This way we
managed to identify some rigidities in the Polish labour market. In the following, we
summarise the most striking results of our analysis.
(i) While Rutkowski (1996a) has shown that there has been a significant increase in
inequality during the first phase of transition (1990–1992), our data on the second
phase (1992–1995) show that the level of inequality has stabilised within the
observation period. The current level of inequality in Poland is comparable to the
ones of other European countries, but much lower than in the U.S. A surprising result
is that hourly wage inequality measured by the Decile Ratio is lower in the public
sector than in the private sector. As a consequence, fears that further inequality
increases are expected when the share of private sector employment rises further are
unwarranted by looking at the overall distribution of hourly wages. However, the
decomposition of the total inequality into the inequality within and between
educational and occupational groups shows that the private sector is leading the trend
towards a larger inequality between these groups. This can be explained by a rising
demand for highly educated people and a falling demand for less well–educated
people.
(ii) Our test results show that, contrary to the public sector, there are no gender
differences in the returns to human capital in the private sector. This is also found by
Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) for Slovenia. Hence, we can also give credence to the
hypothesis that the transition towards a market economy promotes the equality of the
sexes.
(iii) Our empirical wage equations confirm that there has been a significant rise in the
higher–education wage premium as in other transition economies except Eastern
Germany (Steiner and Puhani, 1997). Whereas Rutkowski (1996a) finds that there
has been a devaluation of work experience in Poland between 1987 and 1992, our
results point to rather stable profiles between 1992 and 1995. An exception is the
profile for women in the public sector, which has flattened. The public–sector
experience–wage profile is steeper than the private–sector one for women, but the
reverse is true for men. We explain the result for women by the comparatively high
share of female employment in industries like health care or education, where wages
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are set according to fixed regulations and therefore less responsive to market forces.
The steeper private–sector profiles for men can be accounted for by a selection effect,
i.e. the private sector is able to attract workers with more valuable work experience.
(iv) It is shown that blue–collar workers have by far the highest ceteris paribus
unemployment probability of all occupational groups. Their relative unemployment
probability has even increased between 1992 and 1995, but wage differentials have
not responded to that. Similar rigidities are found for the industries mining,
manufacturing, and construction. Unions may play a decisive factor for these
rigidities, although we could not test the impacts of unions with our data.
(v) Although wage inequality has stabilised within our observation period, inequality
in access to employment has risen significantly through high unemployment and rising
long–term unemployment. Therefore, the costs of the transition seem to be distributed
very unequally across the population (Puhani, 1996; 1995). According to Dolado and
Jimeno (1995), the high unemployment rate of Spain, a country Poland is often
compared with (Sachs, 1993), can inter alia be traced back to the failure to make
labour market institutions more flexible. The Spanish example shows how inflexible
collective bargaining institutions can paralyse a labour market for decades after the
transition period.
(vi) The fact that we have found considerable evidence for wage rigidities in the
Polish labour market has important implications for the potential effectiveness of
labour market policies. These policies have become ever more prominent in Poland
since 1992 as an alternative to mere passive payments of unemployment benefits or
social welfare. The aims of these policies are to promote labour market attachment
(public works), to place workers temporarily into jobs (public works and subsidised
employment) and to improve and to update skills (training). For those measures to
have a long–run payoff in the labour market, a well–functioning labour market is
needed in the first place. Obstacles to wage flexibility are harmful to the re–
employment chances of the unemployed. If these obstacles are reduced or removed,
job chances are likely to improve for outsiders, and active labour programmes will
more easily be able to play their part in supporting the disadvantaged.
(vii) Many authors who analyse the wage structures of economies in transition
conclude that by now, the wage structures of the transition economies have more or
less converged to the ones of market economies. We believe that it would be a great
mistake to see this as a sign of a successful transformation. Indeed, western European
labour markets are currently facing unemployment problems similar to the ones of
central and eastern Europe. Unemployment as well as the need to restructure the
economy seem to be general problems of European labour markets. Bertola and
Ichino (1995) emphasise that the changes in labour demand since the 1970s have
increased wage inequality in the flexible U.S. labour market, but have led to a rise in
unemployment in the more rigid European labour markets. Of course, a move towards
U.S.–style labour market institutions would increase inequality in Europe significantly
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and also lead directly to the question of the sustainability of the social safety nets that
Europeans, East and West, have been accustomed to since the end of WWII. Hence,
the pressure to bring down unemployment by letting wages being set more efficiently
is likely to cause social and political battles in Poland and elsewhere. Just looking at
the moderate inequality changes in the recent period therefore blurs the true picture of
the Polish labour market.
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Appendix
Table A1: Selection of the Sample for the Wage Functions
1992 1995
total PLFS sample 45,739 54,469
age between 16 and 65 38,763 45,727
full–time employees 15,535 17,381
monthly wage given 14,995 16,523
hourly wage given 14,294 15,813
hours between 20 and 100 14,002 15,567
men public sector 6,143 5,531
men private sector 1,585 2,873
women public sector 5,281 5,338
women private sector 993 1,825
Source: PLFS (Polish Labour Force Survey); own calculations.
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Table A2: Sample Means of Variables Reported in Table 2 and Table 3
Variable Men Women
Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector
1992 1995 1992 1995 1992 1995 1992 1995
hourly wage (‘000 ‘95 old PLZ) 27.98 28.00 27.68 24.06 24.46 24.11 22.61 20.33
education
   higher 0.115 0.131 0.073 0.068 0.132 0.158 0.057 0.061
   post–secondary 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.011 0.097 0.094 0.051 0.046
   secondary vocational 0.233 0.254 0.206 0.209 0.296 0.321 0.256 0.271
   secondary general 0.028 0.029 0.026 0.021 0.118 0.111 0.116 0.105
   basic vocational 0.438 0.433 0.507 0.538 0.200 0.187 0.368 0.392
   primary or less 0.170 0.134 0.174 0.152 0.157 0.128 0.152 0.126
work experience 17.822 18.204 13.811 14.245 18.090 18.854 13.958 14.172
work experience^2/100 4.217 4.314 2.890 3.071 4.203 4.458 2.903 3.015
occupation
   manager 0.106 0.058 0.070 0.054 0.084 0.048 0.050 0.031
   professional 0.156 0.224 0.067 0.087 0.377 0.436 0.137 0.182
   white–collar 0.063 0.081 0.085 0.106 0.277 0.266 0.456 0.403
   blue collar 0.675 0.636 0.779 0.753 0.261 0.250 0.356 0.385
industry
   agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.091 0.051 0.018 0.033 0.034 0.017 0.011 0.012
   mining, manufacturing 0.428 0.403 0.396 0.428 0.243 0.208 0.368 0.445
   construction 0.082 0.052 0.295 0.010 0.017 0.012 0.047 0.005
   trade, repairs 0.035 0.054 0.146 0.238 0.093 0.012 0.433 0.030
   transport, communication 0.103 0.004 0.043 0.010 0.061 0.016 0.014 0.044
   financial intermediation 0.007 0.117 0.005 0.044 0.037 0.062 0.013 0.013
   health care, social work 0.036 0.061 0.001 0.001 0.193 0.184 0.009 0.008
   science, education & arts 0.061 0.104 0.006 0.002 0.201 0.088 0.012 0.003
   (public) administration 0.073 0.028 0.006 0.022 0.069 0.024 0.006 0.025
   other 0.083 0.127 0.084 0.210 0.052 0.377 0.087 0.414
assigned to a disability group 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.011
place of residence
   100,000 inhabitants or more 0.313 0.283 0.382 0.311 0.347 0.325 0.445 0.323
   20,000 to 99,999 0.213 0.262 0.181 0.204 0.236 0.276 0.171 0.238
   19,999 or less 0.132 0.137 0.117 0.140 0.148 0.155 0.142 0.138
   rural 0.343 0.318 0.320 0.345 0.269 0.244 0.242 0.301
voivodship unemployment rate 13.690 13.240 13.912 13.228 13.722 13.344 13.872 13.133
# observations 6,143 5,531 1,585 2,873 5,281 5,338 993 1,825
Source: PLFS; own calculations.
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Table A3: Classification of Occupations
Combined Classification Old GUS Classification New GUS Classification
manager top manager
middle manager
lower manager
manager
professional professional professional
technician
white–collar simple white–collar white collar
personal services
blue–collar blue–collar farmer
industrial worker
simple blue–collar
other simple jobs
Table A4: Classification of Economic Sectors
Combined Classification Old GUS Classification New GUS Classification
agriculture, forestry, fishing agriculture, forestry agriculture, forestry, fishing
mining, manufacturing mining, manufacturing mining, manufacturing
construction construction construction
trade, repairs trade trade, repairs
transport, communication transport, communication transport, communication
financial intermediation finance, insurance financial intermediation
health care, social work health care, social aid health, social work
science, education, arts science, education, arts education
(public) administration public administration, justice,
political and social organisations
(public) administration
other other in the material sphere
housing, community services
tourism, leisure, sport
electricity, gas, water
real estates, renting
other services, none, not known
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Table A5: Comparison of Means of Industry Dummies in 1993
Industry Means calculated from
Old Classific. New Classific.
   mining, manufacturing 24.1 23.89
   construction 5.68 5.5
   trade, repairs 10.17 9.57
   transport, communication 4.75 4.2
   financial intermediation 1.13 1.65
   health care, social work 4.43 4.53
   science, education & arts 6.56 5.59
   (public) administration 3.48 3.25
   other 4.84 5.86
   unknown 16.69 18.22
Table A6: Estimated Coefficients on Household Characteristics in Table 2 (Men)
Variable Public Sector Private Sector
1992 t 1995 t 1992 t 1995 t
single 0.017 0.85 –0.125 –4.75 –0.162 –3.63 –0.039 –0.95
children 0.017 3.70 –0.001 –0.20 0.010 0.82 0.002 0.23
no information on children –0.145 –6.41 –0.054 –2.00 0.036 0.82 –0.065 –1.58
net monthly earnings of wife 0.005 2.06 0.000 –0.17 0.001 0.24 0.007* 1.68
no wife found 0.078 2.89 –0.041 –1.32 –0.057 –1.08 –0.003 –0.06
constant 10.121 373.63 10.242 360.04 10.079 189.36 10.136 271.38
Table A7: Estimated Coefficients on Household Characteristics in Table 3 (Women)
Variable Public Sector Private Sector
1992 t 1995 t 1992 t 1995 t
single 0.025* 1.84 0.040 3.02 0.017 0.39 0.099 3.11
children 0.006 1.15 0.007 1.39 –0.002 –0.14 –0.020 –2.05
no information on children –0.072 –3.95 –0.097 –5.32 –0.113 –2.21 –0.149 –4.28
net monthly earnings of husb. 0.005 3.26 0.006 4.23 0.004 0.75 0.011 3.67
no husband found 0.047 2.26 0.069 3.39 0.006 0.11 0.059 1.44
constant 9.667 322.22 9.717 329.48 9.924 126.20 9.836 204.03
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Figure A: Estimated Experience–Earnings Profiles from Rutkowski (1996a)
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Note: The dependent variable in Rutkowski’s (1996a) estimations is the logarithm of gross monthly
earnings.
Source: Rutkowski (1996a), p.99; regressions (1) and (4).
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Table A8: Estimated Coefficients on Unreported Characteristics in Table 6 (Men)
Variable 1992 1992 1995 1995
ROR U t ROR N t ROR U t ROR N t
single 1.242 1.60 2.226 7.82 1.720 3.92 1.228* 1.87
children 0.906 –0.98 0.580 –6.20 0.994 –0.06 0.536 –7.89
children not found 2.397 7.31 0.754 –2.98 1.756 4.29 2.437 7.27
gross earnings of wife 0.994 –0.40 0.980 –1.20 0.972 –1.62 0.974* –1.69
wife not found 0.761* –1.70 0.732 –2.10 0.917 –0.52 0.301 –7.85
private sector 1.137* 1.82 1.105 1.23 0.563 –8.73 0.184 –21.16
Table A9: Estimated Coefficients on Unreported Characteristics in Table 7 (Women)
Variable 1992 1992 1995 1995
ROR U t ROR N t ROR U t ROR N t
single 0.832* –1.83 0.796 –3.21 1.310 2.77 0.674 –5.81
children 1.519 4.59 1.078 1.11 1.516 4.59 1.215 3.07
children not found 1.325 2.35 0.710 –3.87 1.751 4.41 1.624 5.30
gross earnings of husband 1.006 0.55 1.049 5.94 1.019 1.74 1.041 5.37
husband not found 0.999 –0.01 1.445 3.57 0.967 –0.26 0.812 –2.11
private sector 0.833 –2.21 1.073 1.06 0.320 –15.00 0.188 –24.84
